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This paper analyzes the impact of voucher design on student sorting, and more specically inves-
tigates whether there are feasible ways of designing vouchers that can reduce or eliminate student
sorting. It studies these questions in the context of the rst ve years of the Milwaukee voucher
program. Much of the existing literature investigates the question of sorting where private schools
can screen students. However, the publicly funded U.S. voucher programs require private schools
to accept all students unless oversubscribed and to pick students randomly if oversubscribed. This
paper focuses on two crucial features of the Milwaukee voucher program|random private school
selection and the absence of topping up of vouchers. In the context of a theoretical model, it argues
that random private school selection alone cannot prevent student sorting. However, random private
school selection coupled with the absence of topping up can preclude sorting by income, although
there is still sorting by ability. Sorting by ability is not caused here by private school selection, but
rather by parental self selection. Using a logit model and student level data from the Milwaukee
voucher program for 1990-94, it then establishes that random selection has indeed taken place so
that it provides an appropriate setting to test the corresponding theoretical predictions in the data.
Next, using several alternative logit specications, it demonstrates that these predictions are vali-
dated empirically. These ndings have important policy implications.
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School choice and especially vouchers are among the most hotly debated instruments of public school
reform. Several issues relating to vouchers have received widespread attention in the media as well as
popular debate. One of the more important among these is the question of who takes advantage of the
choice opportunity. Do vouchers lead to sorting or cream-skimming, that is, a ight of high income
and more committed public school students and parents to the private sector? Or do they facilitate the
movement of lower income and less able students to the private sector?
This paper analyzes the impact of voucher design on student sorting, and more specically investi-
gates whether there are feasible and realistic ways of designing vouchers that can eliminate sorting. Can
the absence of private school screening obviate student sorting or do vouchers lead to sorting even under
random private school selection? Much of the existing literature investigates the question of sorting in
a framework where private schools can screen students on the basis of their observed characteristics.
But the publicly funded voucher programs in the U.S. (Milwaukee, Cleveland, Florida and Washington
DC) are characterized by an absence of private school selection, they typically require private schools to
pick students randomly. The ability of private schools to choose their customers undoubtedly acts as a
strong force in favor of cream-skimming. Consequently the question arises as to whether vouchers lead
to cream-skimming when the private school selection factor is absent and private schools are required to
accept students randomly. Another important feature of some of the publicly funded voucher programs
in the U.S. (Milwaukee and Florida) is the absence of topping up of vouchers. Can the absence of
topping up and the acceptance of vouchers as full payment of tuition avert sorting?
The paper analyzes these questions in the context of the rst ve years of the Milwaukee voucher
program. Implemented in 1990, the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) made all Milwaukee
Public Schools (MPS) students with family income at or below 175% of the poverty line eligible for
vouchers to attend private schools. The program requires the voucher amount to be taken as full
1payment of tuition by the private schools (that is, vouchers are not allowed to be topped up) and
the latter are not permitted to discriminate between students. Specically, the private schools have to
accept all students unless oversubscribed and have to pick students randomly if they are oversubscribed.
Even the student application form for the MPCP does not ask any question relating to the race, sex,
parents' education, past scores of the student, other prior records (example, truancy, violence) etc. The
questions asked are specically geared only to ascertain whether the student is eligible for the program
(that is, satises the income cuto).
It should be noted here that this paper focuses on the rst ve years (1990-94)1 of the Milwaukee
voucher program. Following a Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling, the Milwaukee program underwent
a major shift in 1998, when the religious schools were allowed to participate for the rst time in the
program. This led to a major expansion of the program, both in terms of the number of choice schools
and in terms of the number of choice students. The majority of the private schools taking part in the
program after this shift were religious schools, while the pre-1998 choice schools were all secular. Due to
lack of availability of adequate student level data, this paper focuses on the smaller Milwaukee voucher
program and the empirical ndings pertain to that part of the program. The theoretical predictions of
the paper should continue to hold in the second part of the program also as the key features that drive
the results continue to remain the same, but there is no way to test their validity in the latter part of
the program.
The paper develops its argument in the context of a theoretical framework where utility maximizing
households care about two goods, school quality and a numeraire good. School quality available to the
households can be of two types|public or private. The households are characterized by an income-
ability2 tuple. The purpose of the model is to analyze the implications of the two crucial features of the
program|random private school selection and acceptance of vouchers as full payment of tuition|on
1 For the remainder of the paper, I will refer to school years by the calendar year of the fall semester.
2 Ability is taken here as a broad measure that captures the ability of the child, and the motivation and commitment
of the parents and the child.
2student sorting. In an equilibrium framework, the model predicts that random private school selection
alone cannot avert sorting. However, random private school selection coupled with the absence of
topping up (that is, a Milwaukee-type program) can preclude sorting by income, although there is still
sorting by ability.
Sorting by ability is not caused here by the supply side factor of private school selection. Rather, it is
induced by the demand side factor of parental self-selection. Vouchers undoubtedly enhance the choice
opportunities of eligible students, however movement to private schools is associated with relocation
costs such as acclimatization and time costs.3 Given income, only households that are more committed
towards their child's education nd it worthwhile to incur this cost and switch their child to a private
school. This leads to sorting by ability. The driving force behind any sorting by income is that at a
given ability level, households with dierent incomes are aected dierentially by the private school
alternative|only the high income households can aord private school tuition or to top up vouchers,
while the low income ones prefer to forego such payment and stay back in public school. The absence of
topping up of vouchers in the Milwaukee program avoids the dierential eect on households in terms
of income and hence prevents sorting by income.4
Using individual level demographic and survey data from Milwaukee for 1990-94, the paper next
proceeds to test the relevant theoretical predictions. Implementing a logistic estimation strategy, it rst
establishes that private schools have indeed picked choice students randomly|there is no statistically
signicant dierence between the successful and unsuccessful applicants on the basis of a variety of
demographic and socio-economic characteristics. This sets the stage for testing the theoretical pre-
dictions. Using several alternative logistic specications, I show that the theoretical predictions are
3 Switching schools exposes students to new teachers and curriculum, detaches them from their friends and social circles,
interferes with extra-curricular activities, requires parents to make schedule changes and adjustments, requires parents to
incur time costs to nd a suitable private school and neighborhood etc.
4 However, note that as far as there are monetary costs of relocation, such as costs of buying new uniforms, books etc.,
there will still be some sorting by income. However, this cost is likely to be much less than the private school tuition or the
payment over and above vouchers required by programs that allow topping up. Note that, under the MPCP, transportation
costs of students switching to private schools with vouchers are borne by the MPS.
3validated empirically. The ndings are reasonably robust in that they survive several robustness and
sensitivity checks.
The ndings of the paper have important policy implications. Both the theoretical and empirical
analysis of the paper strongly suggest that careful design can virtually eliminate sorting by income.
Specically, random private school selection coupled with acceptance of the voucher amount as full
payment of private school tuition can preclude sorting by income. This design, however, cannot avoid
sorting by ability as it is driven by the dierences in interest and motivation of the parents towards
their child's education.
The last decade has seen several theoretical and empirical studies that look at the issue of student
sorting. Epple and Romano (1998) look at the eect of vouchers on the choice between public and
private schools when private schools can screen students by means of tuition discounts. They show that
even a simple public-private system (without vouchers) leads to stratication by income and ability,
while vouchers exacerbate stratication. Using NELS (National Educational Longitudinal Survey) data,
Epple, Figlio and Romano (2004) nd considerable support in favor of this theoretical prediction. In the
context of a computational model, Epple and Romano (2002) examine how alternative voucher designs
can aect stratication and technical eciency. In the presence of private school selection, they show
that type-dependent vouchers (conditioned on student ability) that require schools to accept vouchers
as tuition can prevent stratication.
Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) focus on the nationwide voucher program in Chile that was introduced in
1981. Using dierences across around 300 municipalities, they show that wealthier families and families
with higher education are much more likely to avail of vouchers. In the context of a national, means-
tested school voucher program, Campbell, West and Peterson (2005) show that the chances of both
application and actual voucher take-up increases with mother's education and decreases with family
income, although the eects for voucher take-up are not statistically signicant at conventional levels.
They argue that the pattern for income may be a reection of the program feature that vouchers awarded
4to higher income families were smaller. They also nd that religious motivations play an important role
in choice decisions. On the one hand, Catholics and Evangelical Prostestants were more likely to apply
and take up vouchers, on the other, frequent church attendance had a signicant impact on both stages
of voucher usage. Peterson, Howell and Greene (1999) and Metcalf (2003) nd that voucher students
in Cleveland have higher mother's education and lower income than public school students. The latter
pattern, both studies argue, is most likely due to the program rule that required vouchers to be rst
given to low income families. Howell et. al. (2002) and Howell (2004) nd that higher income families
are more likely to take a voucher in New York City, while Howell et. al. (2002) nds that low income
families are more likely to do so in Dayton, with no dierence observed in Washington, D.C. In a survey
of previous literature, Levin (1998) nds that choosers are more advantaged both educationally and
economically than non-choosers. Hoxby (2003) nds no evidence of cream-skimming in the context of
charter school competition.
Most of the above studies explore the question of sorting where private schools can choose their
customers. It may be noted, though, that some of them analyze the characteristics of the choice
applicants,|this to some extent will yield the eects of random private school selection. However,
anticipation of private school discrimination might aect the decision to apply and the applicant pop-
ulation in programs with private school selection may not be the same as that under random private
school selection. This paper is interested in analyzing the issue of sorting where the supply side private
school discrimination factor is completely absent.
The studies most closely related to this paper are Witte and Thorn (1996) and Witte (2000). They
study the characteristics of students and families in the MPCP and the Chapter 220 program (an
interdistrict program in Wisconsin aimed at racial balance). They nd that the MPCP applicants had
lower income, lower prior math scores, higher mother's education and higher parental involvement than
their counterparts in the MPS.5 The chapter 220 participants had a higher income, higher mother's
5 The odds ratios for income, prior math scores, mother's education and public participation were 0.968, 0.982, 1.289,
1.082 respectively and the corresponding p-values were 0.007, 0.010, 0.002, 0.001. Thus the odds ratios for income and
5education and higher prior scores than the choice applicants and their counterparts in the MPS. Witte
and Thorn argue that parental self-selection and program constraint (income constraint that only the
low income households could apply) were the key causal mechanisms in MPCP.
This study diers from Witte (2000) and Witte and Thorn (1996) in several important ways. First,
the focus of this paper is dierent. It is interested in investigating the eect of random private school
selection and the absence of topping up on sorting. For this purpose, unlike the above two studies, it
rst examines the implications of these factors in a theoretical framework and then tests the predictions
empirically. Second, this study does a more careful empirical analysis in that the regressions allow the
dierent measures of parental involvement to have dierent eects and controls for school, grade and
year indicator variables. Inclusion of school indicator variables allow me to compare applicants and
eligible non-applicants within schools. This rules out any role of school specic factors and ensures
that the eect of parental actions is not confounded with that of school specic actions (example,
enthusiastic administrators encouraging movement, or vice-versa). Moreover, the data on prior test
scores pertain to dierent years, schools and grades, so that using the corresponding dummies rules out
any contamination of the eects due to these factors. Finally, an important dierence with Witte (2000)
and Witte and Thorn (1996) as well as other studies mentioned above6 is that this study combines a
theoretical framework and an empirical counterpart, the theoretical part designed to analyze the eects
of the two crucial features of the Milwaukee program and the empirical part designed to test the
theoretical predictions.
2 The Model
The model consists of a single group of agents|the households. Households are characterized by an
income-ability tuple (y;), where y 2 [0;1] and  2 [0;1]; y and  are assumed to be independently and
prior math scores were very close to one and only marginally signicant.
6 Exceptions are Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple, Figlio and Romano (2004)|the latter study empirically tests
the predictions obtained in the former.
6uniformly distributed. The \ability" of the household is used here as a broad term that includes the
ability of the child, seriousness and motivation of the parents, parents' education levels, parents' desire
for child's education etc. A household obtains utility (U) from the consumption of the numeraire good
(x), school quality () and its ability (). The household utility function is assumed to be continuous
and twice dierentiable and is given by U(x;;) = h(x)+u(). The functions h and u are increasing
and strictly concave in x and  respectively. It follows that households with higher ability, that is,
those that are more motivated and committed, have a higher preference (marginal valuation) for school
quality, U > 0.7 (This is a common assumption in the existing literature.)
School qualities available to a household are public school quality and a continuum of (exogenously
given) private school qualities. The public school is free and oers exogenously given quality q to all
households that choose to attend it. There are a continuum of private schools providing a continuum
of quality. Each private school is modeled as \passive". This is in keeping with the feature of the
Milwaukee voucher experiment, by which private schools are not allowed to discriminate between stu-
dents. They have to accept all students unless oversubscribed and have to accept students randomly
when oversubscribed.8 Households pay a tuition T = t  Q (t > 0) to attend a private school of quality
Q.9 A household incurs switching or relocation costs if it decides to switch from the public school to a
private school. There are two kinds of relocation costs: (i) non-monetary or utility costs of relocation,
c1 (example, acclimatization and time costs),(ii) monetary costs of relocation, c2 (example, costs of new
uniforms, books etc.) The paper considers two alternative scenarios: (i) a simple public-private system,
where the voucher amount is zero and (ii) a voucher system where vouchers take an exogenously given
value v.
7 The assumption U = 0 is made for simplicity. All results go through under U < 0.
8 Of course, in the voucher experiment, they can choose whether or not to enter. I abstract from that here for simplicity.
9 Note that private school quality always exceeds public school quality. Otherwise, no household would pay to attend
a private school.
73 Characterization of Equilibria
This subsection analyzes the household behavior under the two systems in a common framework. Under
each of the two systems, households observe whether vouchers are imposed and make their utility
maximizing decisions, given parameters q, t, c1 and c2. Each household can either choose to go to the
public or to a private school. In the former case, it gets utility h(y) + u(q(e;b)). In the latter case it
gets utility h(y +v  tQ  c2) c1 +u(Q), where Q is the optimal private school quality choice of
household (y;) given v, t, c1 and c2. The parameter v takes on a value of zero in the absence of vouchers.
For the sake of generalization, I rst assume that vouchers have to be topped up, that is v < tQ. A
household (y;) chooses private school i h(y + v   t  Q   c2)   c1 + u(Q) > h(y) + u(q(e;b)).
Dene D = [h(y + v   t  Q   c2)   c1 + u(Q)]   [h(y) + u(q(e;b))]. Note that D
y > 0 and D
 > 0
even when v = 0, so there is stratication by income and ability before the imposition of vouchers.
For each y and given t;v;q;c1;c2, there exists a unique household 0 < ^  < 1 such that all households
with lower ability choose the public school and those with higher ability choose a private school.10 This
^  is the unique solution to [h(y +v  t:Q  c2) c1 +u(Q)]  [h(y) +u(q(e;be))] = 0, where Q is
the optimal private school quality choice of the household (y; ^ (y)).11 Since the indirect utility function
is continuously dierentiable and D > 0, by the implicit function theorem, ^  = ^ (y;v;q;t;c1;c2) is a
continuously dierentiable function. Using the implicit function theorem it is straightforward to check
that for each income level, the cuto ability level ^  is decreasing in v and increasing in q, t, c1 and c2.
Given all other parameters, the cuto ability level varies inversely with y. This is because both higher
income and higher ability increase preference towards private schooling.
Similarly, for each  and given t;v;q;c1;c2, there exists a unique household ^ y such that all households
with lower income choose public school and those with higher income choose private school. Again using
10 I assume that there are always some households in the public and some households in the private sector. This
assumption is made for simplicity. All results go through as long as there is at least one income level for which this
assumption holds.
11 To save some notation the optimal private school quality choice of the corresponding household is always denoted by
Q
. It is obvious that the value of Q
 will change with income and ability.
8implicit function theorem ^ y = ^ y(;v;q;t;c1;c2) is a continuously dierentiable function and the cuto
income level (for each ability) is decreasing in v and increasing in q;t;c1;c2. Thus vouchers lead to both
stratication by ability and income.
An interesting point to note is that the driving force behind sorting here is dierent from that in
Epple and Romano (1998). In Epple and Romano, sorting arises due to an interplay of both demand
and supply side factors. Here, in keeping with the feature of the Milwaukee experiment, private schools
are not allowed to discriminate between students. Rather, they are modeled as passive, so that the
supply side private school selection factor is absent. Sorting here arises exclusively due to the demand
side factor of parental self-selection,|high income households at each ability level and high ability
households at each income level self-select themselves to apply to the choice schools.
The underlying assumption so far has been that vouchers need to be topped up. Now consider
the Milwaukee-type voucher system, where vouchers constitute the full payment of tuition. The above
analysis reveals that random private school selection by itself cannot eliminate sorting,|I now examine
whether random private selection coupled with absence of topping up of vouchers can do so.
Proposition 1 Under c2 = 0, there is sorting by ability, but no sorting by income in a Milwaukee-type
voucher system (of no topping up).
All proofs are in appendix A. The intuitive argument here is as follows. Vouchers enhance the choice
options of public school households, but movement to private school is associated with a non-monetary
cost c2. At each income level, only the higher ability households prefer to switch to a private school.
This is because the higher ability households have a higher marginal valuation of school quality and
hence are more willing to bear the switching cost. This leads to sorting by ability. The crucial driving
force behind sorting by income is that households with dierent income are aected dierently|while
the higher income households nd it protable to pay private school tuition, or to top up the voucher
amount, the low income households do not. When vouchers serve as the full payment of tuition and
c2 = 0, no monetary cost has to be incurred to switch to a private school. Therefore, at each ability
9level, public school households of all income levels behave symmetrically and there is no sorting by
income.
Corollary 1 If c2 6= 0, vouchers lead to sorting by income in addition to sorting by ability.
Under c2 6= 0, sorting by ability occurs for the same reason as above. Moreover, in the presence of a
monetary relocation cost, there will be sorting by income. This is because at each ability level, only the
higher income households nd it protable to pay this cost and switch to a private school. However,
if c2 is small, sorting by income is small. Note that monetary cost is likely to be small in Milwaukee
(at least in comparison to programs that allow topping up), more so because the MPS is required to
provide for the transportation costs of the transferring student.
4 Data
This paper uses the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program public release data les [Witte and Thorn
(1995)]. They contain descriptive data on individual students and schools, student scores for ITBS
reading and math and extensive survey data on both MPS students and students who applied to the
choice program for the period 1990 through 1994. The response rates for the surveys varied between 46%
and 50%, except one survey where the response rate was 30%. Descriptive characteristics of students
consist of personal characteristics (age, birth date, grade, present school, distances to past and present
school) as well as demographic characteristics (sex, ethnicity, whether free/reduced price lunch eligible).
Among the survey data les, this study mostly uses the wave 1 and MPS control group survey
les. Wave 1 surveys were mailed in the fall of each year from 1990-1994 to all parents who applied
for enrollment slots for their children in one of the choice schools for the rst time in that year. MPS
control group surveys were sent in March of 1991 to a random sample of 5,474 parents of students in
Milwaukee Public Schools. The random selection was done by selecting children with birth dates that
were the 15th or the 28th of any month. Among other purposes, the surveys were intended to assess
parental knowledge of and evaluation of the choice program, educational experiences in prior public
10schools, the extent of parental involvement in prior public schools, the expectations parents hold for
their children etc.
5 Empirical Strategy
The empirical part of the paper seeks to test the theoretical predictions that in a Milwaukee-type sce-
nario, there will be no (or very little) sorting by income, although there will still be sorting by ability.
Household ability is measured by the following set of variables|mother's education, the number of times
the parent contacted the school in the prior year over various issues (\contact"), the number of times
per week the parent participates in dierent activities with the child (\child-time"), whether the par-
ents participated in parent-teacher organization and activities in the prior year (\PTO participation"),
educational expectations of the parents and prior test scores of the child. Mother's education, contact,
child-time, PTO participation and educational expectations are respectively measured on scales of 0-2,
0-3, 0-3, 0-5 and 0-3. Higher values indicate higher levels of the corresponding variable.12 The income
measure used here is household income. It is measured in a scale of 0-3. In addition to considering
mother's education and household income as variables ranging on a scale of 0-2 and 0-3 respectively,
I also run alternative specications where I consider dummy variables for dierent levels of mother's
education and household income respectively. In such cases mother's education is modeled by three
dummies denoting categories: \Mother<High school graduate", \Mother High school graduate" and
\Mother>High School Graduate" and income by four dummies denoting categories: \Low income",
\Middle income", \Upper-middle income" and \High income". (For a more detailed description of
these variables, see table B.2.)
Since the testable predictions relate to the case where the private schools pick students randomly,
I rst investigate whether this has been the case in practice. To investigate this, I rst compare the
demographic characteristics, household incomes and ability indicators of choice applicants accepted by
12 For a more detailed description of the survey instruments, categories and codes, see appendix tables B.1 and B.2.
11private schools (\accepted applicants") with those of choice applicants who failed to get a private school
seat (\non-accepted applicants"). Next using the dichotomous variable \accept" (that takes on a value
of 1 for successful applicants and 0 for unsuccessful applicants), I estimate a multivariate logit model.
The purpose is to investigate whether the probability of success depends on a systematic way on any
of the underlying demographic variables, income or ability measures. Random selection would obviate
any such relationship.
If random selection is supported by the data, I proceed to test for stratication by ability and
income. For this purpose, I rst compare the household income and dierent measures of ability of
the choice applicants with that of MPS students who were eligible to apply but chose not to apply.
Any MPS student who is eligible for free or reduced price lunch is eligible to apply to the MPCP.13
Therefore, using the random MPS survey, I extract the group of students who were eligible for free or
reduced price lunches but did not apply. The group of students who applied to the choice program
during 1990-94 form my rst group.
Next I estimate a series of logistic regressions to test for sorting. I dene a dichotomous variable
\apply" that takes on a value of 1 for choice applicants and a value of 0 for eligible non-applicants.
Stratication by income and ability would respectively dictate a positive relationship between the prob-
ability of \apply" and household income and a positive relationship between probability of \apply" and
the dierent measures of ability.14 In each of these regressions, I control for student specic demographic
and socio-economic factors. I use two alternative comparisons to check the robustness of the results.
First, pooling together the choice applicants for all the years 1990-94, I compare their characteristics
13 Under the MPCP, all students with household income at or below 175% of the poverty line are eligible to apply for
vouchers. Households at or below 185% of the poverty line are eligible for reduced price lunches and those at or below
135% of the poverty line are eligible for free lunches. The cuto of 175% is not strictly enforced and households within
this 10% margin are often allowed to apply (Hoxby (2003)). Moreover, almost 90% of the students who were eligible for
free or reduced price lunches also qualied for the free lunch program (Witte (1997)). So there were very few students
with household income between 175% and 185% of the poverty line.
14 To be more precise, stratication by income implies that at each ability level, students with higher income apply, while
stratication by ability implies that at each income level, students with higher ability apply. Empirically, the coecient of
relevance for the former is the logit coecient of income in a regression that controls for ability and other student-specic
demographic variables. The coecient of relevance for the latter is the coecient of ability in a logit regression that
controls for household income and other demographic variables.
12with those of the eligible non-applicants. Second, I do a year-by-year analysis, where I compare the
characteristics of the choice applicants in each year separately with the characteristics of the eligible
non-applicant group.
A disadvantage of the above analysis is that it compares applicants and non-applicants across all
schools, so that the eect of parental actions is confounded with that of school-specic actions. To get
around this problem, I include school dummies, so that applicants from a certain school are compared
to eligible non-applicants from that school only,|this enables me to get rid of any school specic eects
(example, enthusiastic administrators encouraging movement and vice-versa). Witte (2000) and Witte
and Thorn (1997) compares applicants with non-applicants and do not include school indicator variables.
A note on prior scores of students is in order here. First, a large number of applicants and non-
applicants do not have data on prior scores. A reason for this is that the MPS tests students in their
second, fth, seventh and tenth grades, so that there are fewer prior test scores for students who enter
the program in the lower grades (Witte and Thorn, 1997). Since there is heavy enrollment in the MPCP
in the pre-kindergarten through second grade, a large proportion of the students do not have data on
their prior scores. Still another problem is that the students who have data available on the prior
scores may not be random samples of the applicant and non-applicant pools respectively. Therefore the
initial logistic regressions used to investigate stratication in this study do not include prior test scores.
(Results with prior test scores are reported in table 7.)
Second, the prior test scores of applicants (non-applicants) relate to the last available test before
application (before survey), and in many cases this is not the last year's test. The available prior test
scores relate to years 1984-94 while the data relates to applicants for the years 1990 through 1994.
Third, the test scores relate to the dierent grades in which the ITBS was given. The analyses in Witte
(2000) and Witte and Thorn (1997) pool the data on the prior scores of applicants and non-applicants,
irrespective of the year and grade of test. In addition to doing this, I also include year, school and grade
dummies that control for any idiosyncratic behavior relating to any particular year, school or grade.
13Another dierence with Witte (2000) and Witte and Thorn (1997) is in the use of the ability
measures. They aggregate the dierent measures of parental involvement into a single measure of
parental involvement or participation. I, on the other hand, allow the dierent measures of parental
involvement (contact, child-time, PTO participation) to have dierent eects. Since the use of multiple
measures might lead to multicollinearity, I also test for this problem, as discussed in the results section.
6 Results
The results are arranged in the following order in this section. Subsection 6.1 analyzes whether private
schools picked choice applicants randomly as was required by the program. Subsection 6.2 investigates
whether vouchers in Milwaukee led to stratication by ability and income.
6.1 Did Private Schools Pick Applicants Randomly?
Table 1 compares the summary characteristics of the accepted and non-accepted choice applicants in
the MPCP during 1990-94. The two groups are very similar and there is no statistically signicant
dierence between the two groups in terms of any of the demographic characteristics, income and
ability measures.15 I also do a year by year comparison of the two groups in terms of each of these
variables for the years 1990 through 1994. These results are very similar (and hence are not reported
here), |once again there is no statistically signicant dierence between the two groups.
To investigate whether results from this bivariate analysis continue to hold when the dierent vari-
ables are considered simultaneously, I run a series of logistic regressions. Table 2 reports these results.
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable \accept" that takes on a value of 1 if the student was
accepted by an MPCP private school and 0 if the student was unsuccessful in getting a private school
seat under MPCP. Since the coecients from a logit regression are relatively non-intuitive, I also report
the corresponding odds-ratios. The rst specication (columns (1)-(2)) includes gender, race, mother's
15 In addition to comparing the two groups in terms of the overall contact, PTO participation and child-time variables,
I also compare them on the basis of each of the component measures that constitute the overall measure. The results
remain very similar and hence are not reported here. The component measures are outlined in appendix table B.1.
14education and household income as regressors. The second specication (columns (3)-(4)) adds a more
elaborate set of ability measures and a dummy indicating whether the mother was employed full-time.
The third specication (columns (5) and (6)) reports results from a model that, instead of using the
scaled variables mother's education and income, includes dummies for dierent levels of mother's educa-
tion and household income.16 The nal specication (columns (7)-(8)) includes prior reading and math
normal curve equivalent scores as ability measures in addition to mother's education.17 The results are
very similar across all the specications|none of the variables are statistically signicant, indicating
that change in none of the variables has a signicant eect on the probability of acceptance. There
is robust evidence in favor of random selection|not only are the results from the logistic regressions
consistent with those from the bivariate analysis, but inclusion or exclusion of variables do not change
the coecients or odds-ratios by much. Also the model chi-square is never signicant, indicating that
the null hypothesis that the coecients are zero cannot be rejected. This further vindicates random
selection.
6.2 Is there Stratication by Income and Ability?
Having established that random selection took place during the period under consideration, this section
investigates whether sorting took place under random selection. Table 3 compares the summary char-
acteristics of the choice applicants during 1990-94 with that of the eligible non-applicants. Mother's
education of the choice applicants is considerably higher than that of the non-applicants and the dif-
ference is statistically signicant. Consistent with this, the proportion of mothers in the lower levels of
education is much lower and the proportion in the higher levels much higher for the applicants and these
dierences are statistically signicant. The picture is similar for the other ability measures. In terms
of the number of times the parents contact the child's school on a variety of issues, time spent with
16 Inclusion of dummies for dierent categories is useful in that this allows the dierent categories to aect the probability
of application dierently. The problem with this formulation, however, is that the presence of too many categorical variables
may lead to a degrees of freedom problem.
17 Inclusion of the other ability measures in this regression leads to a drastic fall in the number of observations, so I do
not include them here,|the results however remain similar.
15the child in dierent activities (like reading, math, writing, sports etc.), educational expectations for
the child, proportion of parents participating in various parent-teacher activities, the applicants score
considerably higher than the non-applicants and these dierences are always statistically signicant.
Applicant households are however, virtually indistinguishable from the non-applicant households in
terms of household income and the very small dierences between the two groups are never signicant.
Year-by-year comparisons of the dierent ability and income measures have very similar results and
hence are not reported here.18 Thus the results obtained from the bivariate analysis are very much
consistent with the theoretical predictions.
These patterns are mirrored in the graphical analysis (gures 1 and 2). While there is not much
dierence between the income distribution of the applicants and non-applicants, the distribution of the
dierent ability measures are very dierent between these two groups. For each of the ability measures,
the proportions of choice households in the upper categories are much higher than the corresponding
non-applicant proportions while the proportions of applicants in the lower categories are much smaller.
This again supports stratication by ability.
I now investigate whether the pattern that arises from the bivariate comparisons and the income-
ability distribution gures is conrmed in a multivariate logistic regression framework. Using data from
MPCP applicants for 1990-94 and eligible non-applicants from the MPS, table 5 reports the results
from four alternative logit specications. Columns (1)-(4) pool all the years together, while (5)-(9) do
a year-by-year analysis. The dependent variable here is a dummy variable \apply" that takes on a
value of one for choice applicants and a value of zero for eligible non-applicants. Each of the columns
controls for race and sex of the student, columns (3), (4), (5)-(9) also control for an indicator variable
indicating whether mother is employed full-time. All columns of this table report odds-ratios for easier
interpretation, the corresponding logit coecients are available on request. Odds ratio and standard
error of the odds ratio are given by eb and S:E(b)eb respectively, where b denotes the logit coecient.
18 The only dierence is that in 1994 the applicant households had economically and statistically higher income than
the non-applicants.
16Statistical signicance corresponds to the logit coecients, because it is the coecient that is normally
distributed, not the odds-ratio.19 The odds-ratio says by how much the odds of \apply" increases as
the explanatory variable is increased by one unit.
The rst column includes household income and the most basic ability measure, mother's education.
Column (2) includes a more elaborate set of ability measures. These include the number of times the
household contacted the child's school in the previous year (\contact"), whether the parents participated
in parent-teacher activities (\PTO participation"), the time the parent spends with the child in various
activities (\child-time") in a normal week. Column (3) includes educational expectations of the parent
for the child and for a dummy variable indicating whether the mother is employed full-time. The results
are very similar across the dierent specications. Household income is never statistically signicant
and its odds-ratio is always very close to one, indicating that income does not have much eect on
the probability of application. On the other hand, all the ability measures are statistically signicant
(except child-time), with odds-ratios exceeding one by large margins. Consider the logistic regression
in column (3). Although child-time is not signicant, with the odds-ratio exactly equaling unity, the
other three ability measures are highly signicant. A unit increase in mother's education increases the
odds of application by 67%. A unit increase in the variables contact, PTO participation and child-time
increases the odds of application by 7%, 12% and 62% respectively.
Using the specication corresponding to column (3), column (30) displays the impact on probability
of application if each of the categorical income and ability measures are changed from their minimum
to maximum values, while holding every other variable constant at its mean. Having a mother with a
college degree rather than one who dropped out of high school increases the probability of application
by 0.21. Having a household income of above $20,000 rather than a household income of below $5,000
19 Odds-ratio gives the ratio of odds of a one unit change in the explanatory variable and always takes the value e
b,
where b denotes the logit coecient, irrespective of the point of measurement. If p denotes probability, then odds at x is
given by
p(x)
1 p(x), odds at (x + 1) by
p(x+1)





. Using the logistic distribution, it can
be easily seen that the odds ratio equals e
b, where b is the coecient.
17increases the probability of application by 0.04, however note that income is not statistically signicant.
Moving from the lowest category of the contact variable (parents never contacted the school) to the
highest category (parents contacted school 35 or more times in the course of the previous year) increases
the probability of application by 0.31. Students with parents who participated in all 5 parent-teacher
activities considered have a 0.12 higher probability of applying compared to students whose parents
never participated in any such activity. Parents who expect their students to go to graduate school
have a 0.26 higher probability of sending their child to a choice school than parents who expect their
child to just nish some high school. Spending time with the child, on the other hand, do not seem
to have a major eect on the probability of application, which is perhaps not what one would have
expected. Column (4) reports odds ratios from a logit regression that instead of using the previous
formulation of mother's education and household income, includes dummies for various categories of
mother's education and household income. The results are very similar to those obtained above.
Since considering all the ve years together may camouage some distinctive patterns that may be
present in one or more years, I next do a year-by-year analysis. Household income is never statistically
signicant except in 1994 when the odds ratio equals 1.63. In each of the years, mother's education
is highly signicant, with the odds-ratios ranging from 1.75 in 1992 to 2.58 in 1994. The results for
contact, PTO participation, child-time and educational expectations are also similar to those obtained
from the earlier analysis.
Since the regressions above have multiple measures of ability, a potential concern here is muti-
collinearity. Using several methods, I nd that multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem. First, the
correlation between the dierent variables never exceed 0.4 and almost always lie between -0.1 and 0.2.
Second, the estimates are very robust to dropping of variables. Finally, the variance ination factor
corresponding to the dierent coecients never exceed 1.8. A rule of thumb often used is that a variance
ination factor above 10 indicates multicollinearity.
To rule out the eect of any school specic factors, I next run logistic regressions that control for
18school dummies. These regressions compare choice applicants to eligible non-applicants within the same
school. Columns (1) and (2) of table 5 pool all the years together while columns (3)-(7) report results for
individual years. All regressions control for race and sex of the student. Column (1) includes mother's
education and household income as regressors, while column (2) includes a more elaborate set of ability
measures. The regressions for the individual years do not include the wider set of ability measures since
this leads to a considerable fall in sample size, (although the results remain similar). Once again, table
5 shows that an increase in each of the ability measures (except child-time) increases the probability of
application, in fact the eect for mother's education is now even stronger than before. The pattern in
income is very similar to that obtained earlier.
Table 6 looks at the eect of prior reading and math scores of students on the probability of appli-
cation. These logistic regressions also include mother's education, income, sex and other demographic
variables. Since the prior scores pertain to dierent years, schools and grades, column (2) includes year
dummies, column (3) year and school dummies and column (4) year, school and grade dummies. The
patterns for mother's education and income are very similar to earlier, although household income is
no longer signicant in 1994. Prior reading score is never statistically signicant. Although prior math
score is initially signicant, it no longer remains signicant after inclusion of year, school dummies (col-
umn 3) and year, school, grade dummies (column 4). Moreover, the odds ratios for both prior reading
and prior math scores are very close to one. This indicates that not only statistically, but economically
also, an increase in prior scores has no eect on the probability of application. Prior scores are often
looked upon as ability measures in the literature. However, it should be noted here that the above
pattern does not suggest an absence of sorting by ability. While interpreting these results, it should
be kept in mind that many students do not have data on prior scores (for example, just the inclusion
of prior reading and math scores leads to a fall in sample size from 1638 (table 4, column 1) to 765
(table 6, column 1), and this smaller sample may not be a random sample of the applicants and eligible
non-applicants.
19The ndings obtained in the empirical part of the paper can be summarized as follows. There is
strong and robust evidence in favor of stratication by ability. Not only is it manifest in simple bivariate
and graphical analyzes, but is also supported in a logistic framework. This pattern is robust to inclusion
of school dummies and holds for a variety of ability measures such as mother's education, contact, PTO
participation and educational expectations. There is not much evidence in favor of stratication by
income. It is statistically signicant only in 1994, even that eect no longer exists after inclusion of
year-of-test, school, grade dummies and prior scores. (However, as discussed above, the regressions
in table 6 should be interpreted with caution.) Moreover, the odds ratios for income are never very
far from one (except 1994), which further provides evidence that income is not a major factor in the
application decision. Thus the empirical ndings strongly support the predictions obtained from theory.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the impact of voucher design on student sorting and more specically investigates
whether random private school selection and the absence of topping up of vouchers can eliminate student
sorting. Much of the existing literature investigates the issue of sorting where private schools can choose
their students. However, in the publicly funded voucher experiments in the U.S.|Milwaukee, Cleveland,
Florida and Washington DC|the private schools are not permitted, by law, to discriminate between
students. This study addresses the issue of sorting in such circumstances, where the supply side force to
sorting (private school screening) is absent. It focuses on the rst ve years of the Milwaukee voucher
program.
The Milwaukee voucher program is characterized by both random private school selection and the
absence of topping up of vouchers. In the context of an equilibrium model of household behavior, the
paper argues that random private school selection alone cannot preclude sorting by income and ability.
However, random private school selection coupled with the absence of topping up can obviate sorting
by income, but not sorting by ability.
20Implementing a logit estimation strategy, using multiple measures of ability and student level data for
1990-94, the paper then shows that the testable predictions are validated empirically. There is robust
evidence in favor of stratication by ability but no consistent evidence of sorting by income. These
results are robust to alternative specications and various measures of ability. The paper makes an
important contribution to the literature on sorting|it points out, both theoretically and empirically,
that random private school selection along with the absence of topping up of vouchers can preclude
sorting by income.
The ndings of the paper have important policy implications. They strongly suggest that adequate
design of voucher policy can prevent sorting by income. While random private school selection alone
cannot obviate sorting by income, a voucher policy that combines both random private school selection
and full payment of tuition by vouchers can preclude sorting by income.
Finally, it should be noted that the empirical ndings of the paper pertain to the rst ve years
of the Milwaukee program. As outlined earlier, following a Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling of 1998,
religious schools were allowed to participate in the program for the rst time in school year 1998-99. As
a result, the Milwaukee voucher program saw a major expansion both in terms of the number of choice
students and in terms of the number of choice schools. Unlike in the pre-1998 period, the majority of
the schools in the latter period were religious. The predictions of the theoretical model continue to hold
in the second phase (that is, after the shift) also as the key features that drive the results continue to be
satised in the second phase of the program. Note that the participation of religious schools are likely
to attract families of the corresponding religious aliations more,20 but within the various groups the
predictions of the model should continue to hold, that is, there will be no (or very little) sorting by
income, although there is likely to be sorting by ability. However, since adequate student level data are
not available after 1994, there is no way to test their validity in this period.
20 In the context of a national means tested voucher program, Campbell, West and Peterson (2005) show that Catholics
and Evangelical Protestants were more likely to apply and take up vouchers, consistent with the fact that most of the
choice schools were aliated with the Catholic church or associated with Evangelical Protestant traditions.
21Appendix A: Proofs of Results
Proof of Proposition 1. Before the imposition of vouchers, a public school household that is
indierent to switching to a private school satises the following equality:
h(y  tQ) c1 +u(Q) = h(y) +u(q). For each income level and given other parameters, there is a
unique ^ 0 that solves this equation:
^ 0 =
h(y)   h(y   tQ) + c1
u(Q)   u(q)
A.1
After imposition of vouchers, a household that is indierent between public and private options,
satises h(y + v   tQ)   c1 + u(Q) = h(y) + u(q) ) u(  Q)   c1 = u(q), since vouchers are not
allowed to be topped up. Note that since private school quality is not costly here, Q =  Q, where  Q is
the highest private school quality. Since D = [u(  Q)   u(q)]   c1 is independent of income, there is no
sorting by income. Given other parameters, a unique ability level ^ 1 solves this equation:
^ 1 =
c1
u(  Q)   u(q)
< ^ 0 A.2
^ 1 is less than ^ 0 as the numerator of A.2 is smaller and the denominator larger than that in A.1.
Thus vouchers increase sorting by ability even when vouchers fully pay for private school tuition.
Proof of corollary 1. Sorting by ability: Before the imposition of vouchers, a public school
household that is indierent to switching to a private school satises the following equality:
h(y   tQ   c2)   c1 + u(Q) = h(y) + u(q). For each income level and given other parameters, ^ 2
solves this equation where ^ 2 is given by:
^ 2 =
h(y)   h(y   tQ   c2) + c1
u(Q)   u(q)
A.3
After imposition of vouchers, a household that is indierent between public and private options,
satises h(y   c2)   c1 + u(Q) = h(y) + u(q). Given other parameters, a unique ability level ^ 3
solves this equation:
^ 3 =
h(y)   h(y   c2) + c1
u(  Q)   u(q)
< ^ 2 A.4
22^ 3 is less than ^ 2 as the numerator of A.4 is smaller and the denominator larger than that in A.3.
Thus vouchers increase sorting by ability.
Sorting by income: Before the imposition of vouchers, for each ability level and given other
parameters, there exists a unique income level ^ y0 that satises the following
h(y   tQ   c2)   c1 + u(Q) = h(y) + u(q) A.5
After the imposition of vouchers, for each ability level and given other parameters, there exists a
unique income level ^ y1 that solves the equation:
h(y   c2)   c1 + u(  Q) = h(y) + u(q) A.6
Note the left hand sides of A.5 and A.6 are identical. Since  Q > Q and (y   c2) > (y   tQ   c2), it
follows that ^ y1 < ^ y0. This implies that vouchers increase sorting by income.
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24Table 1: Summary Characteristics of Accepted and Non-Accepted Choice Applicants,
MPCP (1990-94)
Accepted Non-Accepted Accepted{Non-Accepted
(std. dev.) (std. dev.) [p-value]
(1) (2) (3)
Proportion Male 0.45 0.50 -0.06
(0.50) (0.50) [0.12]
Proportion African American 0.78 0.79 -0.01
(0.41) (0.41) [0.81]
Proportion Hispanic 0.15 0.14 0.01
(0.36) (0.35) [0.69]
Proportion White 0.05 0.05 0.00
(0.23) (0.23) (0.99)
Proportion Asian 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.06) [0.56]
Mother's Education 1.40 1.39 0.01
(0.74) (0.76) [0.82]
Household Income 1.47 1.52 -0.05
(0.95) (1.00) [0.11]
Proportion of mothers employed full-time 0.40 0.39 0.01
(0.49) (0.49) [0.76]
Contact 8.73 9.07 -0.34
(5.02) (4.69) [0.35]
PTO Participation 2.42 2.39 0.03
(1.50) (1.41) [0.76]
Child-time 10.63 10.75 -0.13
(4.15) (4.19) [0.72]
Educational Expectations 2.31 2.33 -0.02
(0.70) (0.72) [0.72]
Prior Reading NCE Score 40.18 38.90 1.28
(17.56) (15.72) [0.49]
Prior Math NCE Score 40.25 37.25 2.99
(19.60) (20.19) [0.19]
Number of Students 750 346
Household income, mother's education, contact, PTO participation, child-time and educational expectations are
scaled variables. Higher values indicate higher levels of the corresponding variable. For a detailed description of the
variables, refer to tables B.1 and B.2.
Many students do not have data on prior test scores so that the sample size
falls to 255 (230) for the \accepted" and 123 (111) for the \non-accepted" in reading (math).Table 2: Did Private Schools Pick Students Randomly?
Comparing Accepted and Non-Accepted Applicants, MPCP 1990-94
(Using Logistic Regressions)
Odds-Ratio Coe. Odds-Ratio Coe. Odds-Ratio Coe. Odds-Ratio Coe.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
African American 0.99 -0.01 1.08 0.07 1.13 0.13 0.80 -0.22
(0.32) (0.32) (0.52) (0.48) (0.55) (0.48) (0.56) (0.70)
Hispanic 1.00 0.00 1.86 0.62 1.93 0.66 0.43 -0.85
(0.37) (0.37) (1.09) (0.58) (1.14) (0.59) (0.32) (0.75)
Mother's Education 1.10 0.10 1.12 0.12 1.09 0.08
(0.11) (0.10) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16)
Household Income 0.87 -0.13 0.89 -0.12 0.82 -0.19
(0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13)
Contact 0.99 -0.01 0.98 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
PTO Participation 0.91 -0.09 0.92 -0.08
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Child-time 1.04 0.04 1.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Educational Expectations 0.84 -0.18 0.83 -0.19
(0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19)
Mother Employed full-time 1.37 0.32 1.48 0.39
(0.35) (0.25) (0.40) (0.27)
Mother High School Grad 1.05 0.05
(0.42) (0.40)
Mother> High School Grad 1.16 0.15
(0.46) (0.39)
Middle income 1.32 0.28
(0.53) (0.40)
Upper-Middle income 1.06 0.06
(0.42) (0.39)
High income 0.79 -0.23
(0.33) (0.42)
Prior Reading NCE score 1.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Prior Math NCE Score 1.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 852 852 293 293 293 293 314 314
Probability > Chi-Square 0.45 0.45 0.68 0.68 0.80 0.80 0.51 0.51
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Huber-White standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. The even numbered columns report the coecients, while the odd numbered columns report the odds-ratios.
Household Income, Mother's Education, Contact, PTO Participation, Child-time and Educational Expectations are
scaled variables. Higher values indicate higher levels of the corresponding variable. Mother High School Graduate,
Mother> High School Graduate, Middle-income, Upper-Middleincome, High-income are dummy variables for the
corresponding level of mother's education and income respectively. For a detailed description of the variables, refer
to tables B.1 and B.2.Table 3: Summary Characteristics of Choice Applicants and Eligible Nonapplicants, MPCP (1990-94)
Appl. Eligible Non-Appl. (1)-(2) Appl. Eligible Non-Appl. (4)-(5)
(s. d.) (s.d.) [p-value] (s. d.) (s.d.) [p-value]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother's Education 1.40 0.92 0.48 PTO & PTC (Proportions):
(0.74) (0.81) [0.00] Attend PTC 0.91 0.81 0.10
Proportions in groups: (0.29) ( 0.39) [0.00]
Less than High 0.16 0.37 -0.21 Belong to PTO 0.22 0.15 0.07
(0.36) (0.48) [0.00] (0.41) (0.36) [0.00]
High School Graduate 0.29 0.34 -0.05 Attend PTO Meetings 0.55 0.36 0.19
(0.46) (0.47) [0.02] (0.50) (0.48) [0.00]
More than High 0.55 0.29 0.26 Attend PTO Activities 0.50 0.29 0.21
(0.50) (0.45) [0.00] (0.50) (0.45) [0.00]
Household Income 1.44 1.42 0.02 Child-time:
(0.96) (1.00) [0.66] Read/Week 2.05 1.67 0.38
Proportions in groups: (0.90) (1.08) [0.00]
< $5,000 0.17 0.20 -0.03 Math/Week 1.85 1.68 0.16
(0.38) (0.40) [0.11] (1.00) (1.09) [0.00]
$5,000-$9,999 0.37 0.34 0.03 Writing/Week 1.83 1.42 0.41
(0.48) (0.47) [0.22] (1.01) (1.13) [0.00]
$10,000-$19,999 0.29 0.28 0.01 T.V/Week 1.63 1.44 0.19
(0.45) (0.45) [0.56] (0.96) (1.08) [0.00]
>$20,000 0.17 0.17 0.00 Sports/Week 1.35 1.27 0.09
(0.37) (0.38) [0.54] (1.01) (1.11) [0.08]
Contact:
About Academic Performance 1.82 1.33 0.48 Proportion of Mothers 0.40 0.33 0.07
(1.06) (1.05) [0.00] Employed Full-time (0.49) (0.47) [0.00]
About Classes Child took 1.22 0.85 0.37 Educational Expectations 2.32 1.98 0.34
(1.09) (0.93) [0.00] (0.70) (0.82) [0.00]
About Volunteer Work 1.04 0.49 0.55
(1.09) (0.88) [0.00]
About Fund Raising 1.15 0.59 0.57
(1.00) (0.82) [0.00]
About School Records 1.21 1.01 0.20
(0.93) (0.92) [0.00]
About Child's Behavior 1.51 1.22 0.28
(1.19) (1.10) [0.00]
About Helping in Class 0.92 0.50 0.42
(1.06) (0.89) [0.00]
Household Income, Mother's Education and the various contact and child-time variables are scaled variables. Higher values indicate higher levels of
the corresponding variable. For a detailed description of the variables, refer to tables B.1 and B.2.Table 4: Is there Stratication by Ability and Income?
Comparing Choice Applicants and Eligible Non-Applicants, MPCP 1990-94
(Using Logistic Regressions)
1990-94 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
(1) (2) (3) (3










(0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.28) (0.29) (0.20) (0.37) (0.62)
Household Income 0.95 1.04 1.06 0.04 1.09 0.90 0.97 0.93 1.63



















(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
Child-time 1.00 1.00 -0.01 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.03








(0.18) (0.17) (0.14) (0.19) (0.21) (0.34) (0.40)
Mother High School Graduate 1.48

(0.34)









Observations 1638 1013 905 905 737 723 713 657 653
Probability > Chi-Square 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. This table reports odds-ratios. Huber-White standard errors are in
parentheses. Statistical signicance corresponds to the logit coecients, because it is the coecient that is normally distributed, not the
odds-ratio. Odds ratio is given by e
b, where b denotes the logit coecient. All regressions control for race and sex of student. Columns
(3), (4), (5)-(9) control for an indicator variable denoting whether mother is employed full-time. Household Income, Mother's Education,
Contact, PTO Participation, Child-time and Educational Expectations are scaled variables. Higher values indicate higher levels of the
corresponding variable. Mother High School Graduate, Mother> High School Graduate, Middle-income, Upper-Middleincome, High-
income are dummy variables for the corresponding level of mother's education and income respectively. For a detailed description of the
variables, refer to tables B.1 and B.2.Table 5: Examining Stratication by Comparing Choice Applicants and Eligible
Non-Applicants Within Schools
1990-94 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mother's Education 2.09 1.84 2.70 1.86 2.21 2.42 2.84
(0.20) (0.29) (0.58) (0.31) (0.41) (0.48) (0.90)
Household Income 1.03 1.04 0.94 0.87 1.11 0.93 1.69









School dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1250 741 550 537 540 415 300
Table 6: Comparing Prior Test Scores of Choice Applicants and Non-Applicants, 1990-94
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother's Education 1.68 1.59 2.73 2.73
(0.18) (0.24) (0.70) (0.73)
Household Income 0.96 1.00 0.89 0.91
(0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16)
Prior Reading NCE Score 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Prior Math NCE Score 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year dummies N Y Y Y
School dummies N N Y Y
Grade dummies N N N Y
Observations 765 585 352 346
Notes for tables 6 and 7: , , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. This table reports
odds-ratios. Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signicance corresponds to the logit
coecients, because it is the coecient that is normally distributed, not the odds-ratio. Odds ratio is given
by eb, where b denotes the logit coecient. All regressions control for race and sex of student. Household
Income, Mother's Education, Contact, PTO Participation, Child-time and Educational Expectations are
scaled variables. Higher values indicate higher levels of the corresponding variable. For a detailed description
of the variables, refer to tables B.1 and B.2.Table B.1: Survey Questions and Codes Corresponding to Some of the Data Variables
Survey Question Survey Categories Codes
Contact:
During your child's last year in school, how many times (or someone in
your household) contact the school about each of the following?
Your Child's Academic Performance 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
The Classes Your Child Took 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
Doing Volunteer Work at School 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
Participating in Fund Raising 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
Providing Information for School Records 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
Your child's behavior 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
Helping in classroom 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
PTO Participation:
During you and your spouse/partner do any of the following at your
child's public school last year?
Attend parent teacher conferences Yes/No 1/0
Belong to a parent/teacher organization Yes/No 1/0
Attend meetings of parent teacher organization Yes/No 1/0
Take part in activities of parent teacher organizations Yes/No 1/0
Belong to other organizations dealing with school matters Yes/No 1/0
Child-time:
How many times in a normal week would you say you participate in
the following activities with your child?
Read with or to your child 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
Work on arithmetic or math 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
Work on penmanship or writing 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
Watch educational programs on TV with your child 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
Participate together in sports activities 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
Other homework 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more 0,1,2,3 respectively
The responses corresponding to each question were grouped in the survey categories shown. These categories were
correspondingly designated by the above codes. The regressions include overall measures of contact, PTO participation
and child-time which are obtained by combining the respective component measures using an additive scale. \Contact"
ranges from 0-21, \PTO participation" from 0-5 and \child-time" from 0-18.Table B.2: Survey Questions and Codes Corresponding to Some of the Data Variables
(Continued)
Survey Question Survey Categories Codes
Educational Expectations:
How far do you expect your child to go in school? (Educ. Expec.)
Finish some high school 1 0
Graduate from high school 2 1
Go to vocational school after high school 3 1
Go to College 4 2
Go to graduate or professional school after college 5 3
Mother's Education
Please check the highest education level for female parent/guardian
Eighth grade or below 1 0
Some high school 2 0
GED 3 1
High School Graduate 4 1
Some college 5 2
4-year college 6 2
Post-graduate work 7 2
Household income:










$50,000 or more 10 3
The responses corresponding to each question were grouped in the survey categories shown. These categories
were correspondingly designated by the above codes. In addition to considering mother's education and
household income as variables ranging on a scale of 0-2, I consider dummy variables for dierent levels
of mother's education and household income respectively. In such cases mother's education is modeled
by three dummies denoting categories: \Mother<High school graduate", \Mother High school graduate"
and \Mother>High School Graduate" and income by four dummies denoting categories: \Low income"









































Distribution of Income, by Applicant Status































Distribution of Mother's Edn., by Applicant Status






























Distribution of PTO Participation, by Applicant Status
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Figure 3. Stratification by Ability, MPCP (1990-94) (Continued)